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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the costs of job loss in China, using unique new data from the 
Rural-to-Urban Migration in China (RUMIC) data set for the year 2009. We 
investigate conventional labor market outcomes upon displacement like the length of 
unemployment spells, hours worked and monthly earnings. We also analyze whether 
displaced workers are more likely to be in informal employment relationships or self-
employed or less happy than their non-displaced counterparts. We also look at health 
and psychic costs as additional outcomes. Displaced migrant workers do not 
encounter losses in terms of longer unemployment spells or wage penalties, while 
urban displaced workers incur very large costs in terms of these two outcomes. These 
results point to segmented urban labor markets in China. All displaced workers have 
an increased likelihood of being informal, while only migrants among the displaced 
experience a lowered incidence of self-employment. Also, health costs and psychic 
costs can be linked to displacement although these costs are not prevalent in a uniform 
fashion. Stratification of the data by gender, level of development and ownership 
seems important as it shows substantial heterogeneity of the costs of job loss across 
these dimensions.      
Keywords: Costs of job loss, worker displacement, propensity score matching, China. 
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The Costs of Worker Displacement in Urban Labor Markets of China 
 
1. Introduction 
In most OECD countries the costs of job loss are large for displaced workers, but 
these costs differ in their nature across countries. For example, in the U.S. labor 
market these costs are long-term even for displaced workers who find re-employment, 
with relative wage losses estimated to lie between 7 and 35 percent even several years 
after finding a new job (see Couch and Placzek 2010). In contrast, most studies on 
displacement in Continental Europe do not find large relative wage losses for 
displaced workers who have found re-employment; instead the main costs of job loss 
consist in foregone earnings due to periods of non-employment (see, e.g., Kuhn 2002 
and Hijzen et al. 2010).  
  Due to a lack of appropriate data, the consequences of job loss in transition 
and emerging economies have received scant attention in the literature in spite of 
large restructuring and labor reallocation since the beginning of economic reform 
(Djankov and Murell 2002).  Rigorous studies on worker displacement in transition 
economies are few: Lehmann, Philips and Wadsworth (2005), Lehmann, Pignatti and 
Wadsworth (2006) and Lehmann, Muravyev, Razzolini and Zaiceva (2013) discuss 
the incidence and the costs of worker displacement in Estonia, Ukraine and Russia. In 
these studies, the authors find no relative wage losses of re-employed displaced 
workers, but establish large foregone earnings due to long unemployment spells for a 
substantial fraction of displaced workers. In contrast, the study by Orazem, 
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Vodopivec and Wu (2005) on Slovenia finds lasting relative wage losses of re-
employed displaced workers.   
 The small existing literature on worker displacement in China focuses on the 
incidence and the costs of the large retrenchment that occurred in the latter half of the 
1990s. This retrenchment was connected to the restructuring of State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), which prior to restructuring exhibited substantial labor hoarding, 
a phenomenon prevalent in command economies (Kornai 1992).  To improve the 
financial position and labor productivity of SOEs, the Chinese government insisted on 
large labor shedding amounting to about 25 percent of the workforce in these firms 
(Appleton et al. 2006a). The available evidence points to very large costs for 
displaced workers especially in terms of foregone earnings since many of these 
workers had extremely long non-employment spells. In addition, those workers who 
found reemployment also experienced large wage penalties.1  
The analysis of worker displacement in this paper is more general for several 
reasons. First, it covers involuntary separations not only from SOEs but also from 
private firms and considers both urban workers with urban “hukou” and rural-urban 
migrants as populations at risk. Second, we look at the period 2003 to 2009, which is 
not dominated by massive government-sponsored layoffs but entails job and worker 
reallocation predominantly driven by market forces. Third, the 2009 wave of the 
Rural to Urban Migration in China (RUMIC) data set that we use covers 15 urban 
labor markets, embedded in regions, which vary substantially regarding their level of 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Appleton et al. (2006a),  Giles, Park and Cai (2006), Knight and Yueh (2004)  and 
Betcherman and Blunch (2006). 
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development, and thus allow a broader regional coverage than previous studies.2 The 
employed data also permit a precise definition of the control group, which enables us 
to evaluate the costs of displacement in a more rigorous fashion.  
 We look at traditional labor market outcomes in connection with 
displacement like the length of the unemployment spell, earnings upon reemployment 
as well as hours worked. We also analyze whether informal or self-employment is 
disproportionally associated with involuntary job separations as shown by Lehmann, 
Razzolini and Zaiceva (2012) for the Russian labor market. We investigate whether 
displacement has an impact on happiness and how it affects physical and mental 
health. With the latter outcomes, we thus also contribute to a strand of the literature 
that has started to look at non-conventional outcomes that are related to workers’ 
welfare as well as the welfare of their families. For example, Sullivan and von 
Wachter (2009) analyze life expectancy as an outcome and establish that 
displacement at age 40 will shorten the life expectancy of an average worker in the 
United States by 1 to 1.5 years.  Lindo (2011) investigates parental job loss and infant 
health in the United States. His analysis reveals that husbands’ job losses have 
significant negative effects on infant health. Liu and Zhao (2011) study a similar issue 
in China, looking at the effects of the mass layoff of parents in the mid-1990s on their 
                                                 
2 Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuxi, Hangzhou and Ningbo are the surveyed 
cities located in developed regions, while the cities Zhengzhou, Luoyang, Hefi, Bengbu, Chongqing, 
Wuhan, Chengdu are found in less developed regions. 
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children’s health. They find that paternal job loss affects children’s health negatively 
while maternal job loss does not show any significant effect.3 
 The reform of labor relations that essentially abolished guaranteed life-long 
employment picked up speed in the 1990s (Dong and Xu 2009). It led to the 
emergence of three distinct types of workers in the urban labor markets of China: 
workers employed in SOEs and private firms who have never been laid off, laid-off 
workers who are urban residents, and rural-urban migrants (Appleton et al. 2006b). 
Analyzing labor market developments in the wake of the reforms, Knight and Yueh 
(2004) try to establish the existence of a dual urban labor market in China by 
presenting evidence on mobility rates of migrants and urban residents. The mobility 
rates of migrants far exceed those of urban residents, which can be taken as evidence 
of a dual labor market.  
Our paper, using a different perspective, also asks the question whether the 
evidence points to an integrated urban labor market or to a dual labor market with a 
competitive segment for migrants and a primary segment where urban workers, who 
have not been laid off, can extract some rent and some of the laid-off urban workers 
are rationed out of this segment. Nearly two decades into labor market adjustment we 
try to answer this politically relevant question by comparing the costs of displacement 
of migrants and urban workers in terms of the length of unemployment spells and of 
monthly earnings upon reemployment.  
                                                 
3 There are many more studies on the health costs of displacement; this growing literature is discussed 
in Lindo (2011). 
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The remainder of the paper has the following structure. The next section 
discusses the data and gives a descriptive analysis of worker displacement in China. 
In section 3 we briefly sketch the empirical models used, followed by the presentation 
of the main results in section 4. Finally, robustness checks are discussed in the 
penultimate section, while in section 6 we draw some conclusions.  
 
2. Data and descriptive analysis 
2.1 Data 
This paper uses the Rural to Urban Migration in China (RUMIC) dataset, which is 
administered by the Australian National University and Beijing Normal University of 
China. The RUMIC dataset has as its main focus rural-to-urban migrants. However, 
for comparison purposes there is also a sample of urban residents who possess urban 
“hukou”, i.e. who have the right to reside in urban centers. The data set is conceived 
as a panel and thus far the two waves of 2008 and 2009 have been made available to 
researchers.  However, only in the 2009 wave do we have precise information on the 
reason for job separation; so we only use this cross section of the data. We 
concentrate on individuals of the working age population, that is we restrict the age 
span to 15--65 years, resulting in 8436 and 4527 respondents in the urban sample and 
in the migrant sample respectively.  
The data set has a retrospective part which enables us to identify a separation 
at any point in time between 2003 and 2009.4 Vital for our analysis is, of course, 
                                                 
4 Since a job separation is for most workers a traumatic event, we think that recall bias is minimal or, at 
least, not correlated with displacement.  
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information on the reason for separating from a job. The possible answers given in the 
supplement are reproduced in table A1. They are taken from standard answers in labor 
force surveys administered in OECD countries but adjusted to the specifics of the 
Chinese labor market.  As respondents are told to only give one answer it is relatively 
straightforward to classify job separations into quits and displacements.5 Answers 1 
through 5 in table A16 are in most cases related to involuntary job loss, although 
answer 5 might involve individual dismissals connected to improper behavior 
requiring disciplinary action. In our main analysis we classify answers 1 through 5 as 
involuntary job loss; we also perform robustness checks where we tighten the 
definition of displacement by dropping respondents giving answer 5. We find no 
substantial differences to our main analysis with the migrant sample, although, as we 
can infer from table A1, those giving answer 5 are roughly 19 percent of migrant 
displaced workers. On the other hand, among the urban displaced only about 4 
percent experience individual dismissals initiated by the employer.    
The RUMIC dataset provides detailed information on demographic 
characteristics, happiness, health conditions, labor force status, industry affiliation and 
occupation, salary, formal, informal and self-employment. We will analyze the losses 
of displaced workers taking quitters and still-employed workers as the control group. 
In the questionnaire of urban sample, we use the question “So far, have you ever 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of the pros and cons of using survey data to define displacement see the introductory 
chapter in Kuhn (2002). 
6 These answers are: (1) Factory bankruptcy or closure; (2) Moving of enterprise/organization; (3) 
Factory acquisition, restructuring and privatization; (4) Laid off collectively; (5) Dismissal intiated by 
employer.  
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changed a job, resigned, retired or become unemployed”. If the answer to this 
question is “No”, then this person is identified as a still-employed worker (a stayer). If 
the answer to this question is “Yes”, then this person is identified as a displaced 
worker or a quitter depending on the reason given why she or he left the last job. In 
the questionnaire for the migrant sample, the corresponding question asks “Is your 
current job the first job after migration”. If the answer to this question is “Yes”, then 
this person is identified as a stayer. A negative answer to this question identifies this 
person as a displaced worker or a quitter depending on the reason given for the 
separation from her or his last job. We are able to establish the unemployment spell of 
each workers who separates since we know (up to a month) the end of the previous 
job and the beginning of the new job.7 For those who separate from a job we are thus 
able to calculate the months of the most recent unemployment spell.  
The empirical literature on displacement points to a strong correlation between 
industry affiliation and occupation on the one hand and the incidence and costs of job 
loss on the other hand. There are two problems with the migrant sample of the 
RUMIC dataset regarding industry affiliation and occupation. First, questions on 
working industry and occupation in the migrant sample are open questions and we 
have to encode them. There are more than 500 items in the variable of industry 
affiliation and more than 900 items in the variable of occupation. We integrate them 
into 9 broad industry and 5 broad occupational categories, respectively. These 
                                                 
7 We can determine each spell if there is no recall error on the part of the respondents. Given the data 
we have we are not able to pin down the existence of recall error, but we prefer to think that in a 
country where life-long employment has been the rule such a dramatic event as job loss or job change 
can be recalled by virtually all workers with some precision. 
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categories do not coincide completely with the industry and occupation codes that are 
given to us in the urban sample. Second, respondents in the migrant sample are 
reluctant to give information on, or do not know, their industry affiliation and 
occupation. So, once we control for these variables, the number of observations used 
in the analysis of the migrant sample falls substantially. We, therefore, provide both 
the results with only demographic and ownership controls and with industrial and 
occupational controls added. The latter augmented empirical models also include 
controls for local labor market conditions, which are crucial determinants of labor 
market outcomes (Heckman et al. 1999). We use city dummies to proxy local labor 
markets. 
The number of quits in the urban sample depends crucially on how we treat 
retirements. Inspection of table A1 leads us to conclude that roughly half of all quits 
among urban workers are retirements or early retirements. For our analysis, we 
exclude these observations from the subsample of quitters since we are only interested 
in those workers separating voluntarily from their jobs who remain in the labor force. 
It is noteworthy but, of course, expected that migrant workers have an extremely low 
incidence of retirement, amounting to no more than half a percent. When we exclude 
retirees and early retirees the urban sample is reduced from 8436 to 6382 
observations, while the change of the migrant sample is a negligible 13 observations. 
Given the large attrition of migrants that is observed between waves and 
associated with many of the migrants choosing to return to their rural place of origin 
(see, e.g., Kong et al. 2009), it can well be that the migrants who are interviewed in 
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2009 are a select group. Those migrant who have been displaced at some point in time 
between 2003 and 2009 and who remain in the urban labor market might be 
particularly productive and search effective in finding a new job, while the less 
productive among the displaced migrants might have returned home. We, however, do 
not think that the large differences in the costs of job loss that we observe when 
comparing these costs across the two samples can be entirely due to selection bias.  
 
2.2 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the three mutually exclusive subsets of the 
migrant and urban samples: displaced workers, quitters and stayers. The variables 
related to demographics, ownership type of the firm and outcomes are of particular 
interest and will be discussed in some detail. The distributions of industry affiliation 
and occupation are also shown.  
Urban workers are about 7 years older on average than migrants; in the 
migrant sample displaced workers are somewhat older than their non-displaced 
counterparts, whilst in the urban sample the displaced are on average about 8 years 
older than quitters and stayers. Among urban workers the shares of females and males 
are more or less equal, while in the migrant sample male workers are 
disproportionately represented, in particular in the subset of the displaced. A majority 
of all workers is married; however, urban workers have an incidence of marriage that 
is up to 20 percentage points larger than migrants. Unsurprisingly, urban workers are 
on average more educated than migrants, with the difference in years of education 
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being particularly large for the stayers of the two samples. It is also noteworthy that 
displaced workers on average have the least education whether we look at migrants or 
urban residents.  
There is a huge divergence between the two samples if we look at the 
ownership type of the firm in the last job (for displaced and quitters) and in the 
current job (for stayers). More than 80 percent of migrants worked or work in private 
firms, while a large majority of urban workers had the last job in an SOE or are still 
working in such a firm. As far as the urban sample is concerned, it is also striking that 
displaced workers originate much more from SOEs than quitters; so, for urban 
workers the state sector still drives displacement, hinting at an ongoing restructuring 
process of this sector. 
Inspection of the spell length of unemployment in Table 1 produces two 
important results. First, migrants who separate from jobs have much shorter spells 
than their counterparts in possession of urban “hukou.” Second, the average spell 
length of displaced and quitting migrants do not really differ while a displaced worker 
in the urban sample experiences extremely long and far longer spells than urban 
quitters. The average completed duration of more one and a half years for displaced 
urban workers is in line with, e.g., the findings of Betcherman and Blunch (2006) who 
look at the impact of retrenchment in two large Chinese cities. So, our numbers 
suggest that the average laid off urban worker, if displaced from an SOE in the years 
2003 to 2008, faces similar disadvantageous labor market prospects as the workers 
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experiencing mass layoffs in the latter half of the 1990s, when the government-
inspired retrenchment program was at its peak.  
Table 1 also reports the four outcomes hours, salary, informal employment 
and self-employment in the current job for stayers and separators. These outcomes, 
therefore, are used to establish potential costs of displacement upon re-employment. 
The worked hours per week are in general much larger for migrants than for urban 
residents, which corresponds to the evidence from earlier surveys. Migrants who 
voluntarily separated from their jobs have a particularly long working week in their 
new jobs. The average monthly salary is very similar for the three subsets of the 
migrant sample, while upon re-employment the urban displaced seem to incur a large 
wage penalty relative to quitters and stayers. The incidence of informal employment, 
which we define as an employment relationship without contract8, is much higher 
among migrants and reaches nearly 40 percent among displaced migrants. In contrast, 
urban displaced workers have with about 17 percent an incidence that is only a few 
percentage points higher than urban quitters. Particularly striking is the low incidence 
for urban stayers, which at around 7 percent is more than 20 percentage points lower 
than for their migrant counterparts. Finally, more than one fifth of all non-displaced 
migrants are self-employed, while displaced migrants like all three categories of urban 
workers on average have a percentage of self-employment that remains in the single 
digits.  
                                                 
8 The literature on informality uses essentially a legalistic definition or a productivity based definition. 
Here we use the legalistic definition. For a discussion of definition issues regarding informality see 
chapter 1 of Perry et al. (2007). 
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The incidence of excellent, good or average self-assessed health9 is high in all 
subsets of the two samples and there are no discernible differences between the 
displaced and their non-displaced counterparts. Taking the Body Mass Index (BMI) as 
a measure of objective health we see that the average respondent is well within the 
norm even if urban workers have a slightly higher value. Also, there are no 
differences between the three categories within migrant and urban workers. So, at 
least as far as these unconditional statistics are concerned there seems to be no 
correlation between displacement and health status whether of a self-assessed or of an 
objective nature. When we turn to self-professed depression and happiness10 the 
picture is clearly different. Displaced workers have roughly twice the incidence of 
feeling depressed relative to stayers in both samples, with migrants in general feeling 
more depressed than urban workers. A mirror image of this is happiness, since 
displaced workers are on average roughly 7 and 5 percentage points less happy than 
stayers in the migrant sample and urban sample respectively. As we would expect 
urban resident workers seem in general happier than migrants.   
 The multinomial logit results for the migrant sample in Table 2 confirm that 
males and older workers have a higher probability to be displaced although these 
                                                 
9 Respondents when asked about their current state of health can choose between five answers: 
excellent, good, average, poor and very poor. We take the first three answers as an indication of 
assessing oneself as being healthy. 
10 When asked whether they feel depressed individuals can respond not at all, a little bit, fairly 
seriously and very seriously. We take the last two answers to determine the incidence of feeling 
depressed. The way the survey solicits information, we cannot state that we are dealing with clinical 
depression here. The question on happiness asks: “Are you happy when you consider each aspect of 
life?” We take the first two answers of the possible answers very happy, fairly happy, not very happy 
and  not happy at all as an indication of happiness.  
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effects are quite small. They also show that being married and education have no 
predictive power regarding the likelihood of displacement. The marginal effects on 
industry affiliation demonstrate on the other hand that migrant workers have an 
especially high probability to be displaced from the manufacturing sector while being 
affiliated with public management and social organizations reduces the likelihood of 
being displaced the most. The marginal effects on the city dummies show no clear 
pattern since in most cities displacement is lower than in Guangzhou (the omitted 
category), no matter whether the city is located in a developed or less developed 
region.  
 Turning to the results for the urban sample, being married and having more 
education lowers the probability of being displaced while older workers are more 
affected by layoffs. The most striking results are, however, linked to ownership of the 
firm and industrial affiliation. With working in a private firm and in agriculture as 
reference categories, working in an SOE and in manufacturing raises the likelihood of 
being displaced by 22 and 19 percent respectively, while working in financial 
intermediation or in health lowers it by 21 percent. So, it is above all being tied to an 
SOE and to manufacturing that is associated with a layoff event. We also see that 
some occupations are an important predictor of layoffs pointing to the importance of 
controlling for occupation when evaluating the costs of job loss. Finally, in the urban 
sample relative to residing in Guangzhou workers residing elsewhere are more 
affected by displacement. Like in the migrant sample, a clear regional pattern cannot 
be made out since some of the cities with larger displacement are high growth regions 
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(e.g., Shanghai) and some are located in less developed areas (e.g., Luoyang and 
Bengbu).    
So, are displaced workers systematically different from non-displaced 
workers? The information thus far collected allows us to infer that displaced workers 
are more likely to be male, be less educated, to be older and to work 
disproportionately in manufacturing and in SOEs. The latter factor, however, only 
plays a role for the sample of urban workers. It is also noteworthy that factors related 
to the firm and to the job have more predictive power than demographic factors as the 
much larger marginal effects on the dummies for ownership type, industry affiliation 
and occupation attest. So, while we have a broader coverage of displacement than the 
previous literature we still find that most of displacement takes place in the 
manufacturing and the state sectors pointing to ongoing restructuring in this part of 
the Chinese economy. However, as an additional result we establish that the laying off 
of less productive workers is not confined to the state sector but economy-wide. 
In Table 4, we report the cumulative return rates to employment, conditional 
on unemployment duration, of migrant and urban displaced workers and compare 
these to return rates of those who quit. These rates are based on the complement of the 
Kaplan-Meier estimator of survivor functions (Smith 2002). The most striking result 
is the large difference in the return-to-employment pattern of migrants and urban 
residents. Nearly half of all displaced migrant workers return to employment within a 
month, i.e. they experience a job-to-job move, and 90 percent are absorbed into 
employment within a year. It is also noteworthy that among migrants the displaced do 
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not face more difficulties in finding reemployment than those who quit. For urban 
residents who separate from a job the situation is very different. Only a quarter of 
urban displaced workers experiences a job-to-job move and, what is even more 
striking, less than half are able to find reemployment within a year leading to very 
long average unemployment spells. Essentially, a minority immediately finds a new 
job while the rest lingers on in unemployment.  For urban quitters the difficulties are 
less severe although only roughly two thirds find reemployment within a year.  
 Contrasting the cumulative return rates to employment of the migrant and 
urban samples we can make two inferences. First, for migrants the costs of job loss in 
terms of unemployment spells are mild, while they are extremely severe for urban 
residents. Second, the observed patterns lead us to moot that we are confronted with 
two distinct segments of the labor market in the cities under study: one segment for 
migrants, which seems quite competitive insofar as job separators are not rationed out 
of the market, and one segment for workers with urban “hukou” where many job 
separators seem to be blocked from reentering employment. We take this as a first 
piece of evidence that urban labor markets in China are dualistic and not integrated. 
   
3. Our research approach 
Our options of empirically modeling the costs of job loss are quite limited given that 
we can only use the cross section of 2009 of the RUMIC data set. We unfortunately 
cannot use a fixed effects regression, which is one of the workhorses in the 
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displacement literature. Instead we start out with simple OLS regressions of the 
following type:  
iii DISXy εδβ ++=                                     (1) 
where yi is labor market outcome for individual i an element of the set 
{unemployment spell, monthly earnings, hours worked, the incidence of informal 
employment, the incidence of self-employment, the BMI, the likelihood of being in 
good health, of feeling depressed, and of being happy}. The vector X contains 
demographic variables, the ownership, industry, occupation and city dummies shown 
in table 1. DIS is a dummy set equal to 1 if worker i was displaced any time between 
2003 and 2009. In our simple OLS specification, the coefficient δ thus captures the 
average effect of any displacement in the indicated period on the outcome variable. 
Finally, ε is a white noise error term. In the case that there are no unobserved 
heterogenous factors that impact on the probability to be displaced and on the 
outcome variables of interest the average displacement effect is identified with the 
coefficient δ. However, it is unlikely that controlling for the above mentioned 
conditioning variables will eliminate all selection problems. Nevertheless, while we 
treat our OLS results with caution, we can point out that the multinomial logit 
regressions show very strongly that observed firm and job related factors are far more 
important than observed personal characteristics, and thus probably also unobserved 
personal characteristics. In addition, one of our robustness checks consists in looking 
only at the subset of displaced related to firm closure. This scenario of displacement is 
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often considered to have less selection problems than when predominantly 
redundancies are involved. As we will show, we get very similar results when only 
considering this subset of the displaced.  
We extend our analysis at any rate, hoping to get closer to a causal effect of 
displacement, by employing a matching estimator, using propensity score matching. 
When evaluating the costs of worker i’s displacement we essentially ask the question 
that is posed in the evaluation literature: What is the outcome (e.g., monthly earnings, 
unemployment spell, etc.) of worker i who is treated (here: displaced) relative to the 
hypothetical outcome that would have prevailed if the same worker had not been 
treated (displaced)? Since the treated worker can never be observed in the non-
treatment state the problem arises how to construct a credible counterfactual. When 
the treatment is randomized, under certain assumptions it is sufficient to compare the 
average outcome of the treated ( ( (1) | 1)i iE Y D = ) and the average outcome of the 
control group (i.e. the non-treated) ( (0) | 0)i iE Y D = . The difference in these two 
average outcomes will identify the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT): 
( (1) | 1) ( (0) | 1) (2)i i i iATT E Y D E Y D= = − = , 
With randomized experiments, if we do not encounter “randomization and 
substitution biases” (Heckman and Smith 1995), 
( (0) | 1)i iE Y D = = ( (0) | 0)i iE Y D = , 
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i.e. the average outcome of the non-treated is a consistent estimate of the 
counterfactual ( (0) | 1)i iE Y D = . 
Alas, displacement is never a randomized treatment and we need to employ those 
techniques of the evaluation literature that are applied to observational data (see, e.g., 
Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 1999). Essentially these techniques try to get 
( (0) | 0)i iE Y D =  as close as possible to the counterfactual ( (0) | 1)i iE Y D = . In this 
study, we employ the propensity score matching procedure proposed by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983). For identification of a causal treatment effect they invoke the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA): conditional on workers’ characteristics, 
the potential outcome in the non-treatment scenario is independent of the treatment 
status, i.e. 
( (0) | 1, ( )) ( (0) | 0, ( )) (3)i i i iE Y D P X E Y D P X= = =  
where Di is the treatment variable that takes the value 1 under treatment and the value 
0 if the individual is in the non-treatment state, while Yi(0) is the outcome variable for 
individual i in the non-treatment state.  P(X) is the propensity score, estimated with 
the probit model: 
( ) Pr( 1| ) (4)P X D X= = . 
Matching takes place on the propensity score using the nearest neighbor method. As 
controls we take those who remain in their jobs (stayers) and those who quit 
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(quitters).11  The covariates presented in table 1 are used for our propensity score 
matching procedure.  
At an intuitive level, propensity score matching attempts to balance the 
unobserved characteristics of two samples by balancing the observed characteristics. 
This works particularly well when the number of covariates is large and includes 
those variables that are potentially correlated with the outcome variable of interest. 
Employing the variables shown in table 1 we try to balance the unobserved 
characteristics with our matching procedure and thus reduce selection biases. The 
difference in the average outcome of those displaced and the average outcome of the 
controls might thus get us closer to the causal effect of displacement: 
))(,0|)0(())(,1|)1(( XPDYEXPDYE iiii =−==∆              (5). 
Analytical standard errors are calculated using the algorithm developed by Lechner 
(2001). 
 
4. Empirical findings on the costs of displacement 
4.1 Overall displacement effects 
Table 5 presents the nine outcomes that we predominantly associate with a loss 
brought about by displacement for migrant and urban workers. The results related to 
unemployment spells confirm what we have learned about cumulative return rates to 
employment. For migrants there is no penalty associated with displacement as far as 
                                                 
11 The recent literature selects both stayers and quitters as controls, since choosing only stayers as 
controls might lead to an upward bias of displacement effects. However, Davis and von Wachter 
(2011) find it preferable to use only stayers. As one of our robustness checks we will employ only 
stayers as controls. 
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the duration of unemployment is concerned, while this penalty is between 6 and 8.5 
months for the displaced among the urban residents. Putting more trust in the 
matching results with the full set of control variables we find that urban displaced 
workers have unemployment spells that are nearly three quarters of a year longer than 
their quitting counterparts. We also establish no wage penalty upon reemployment for 
migrants, while urban displaced workers experience a monthly earnings loss of 
between 31 and 23 percent. Worked hours per week in the current job are not affected 
by displacement for migrants, while they are slightly raised for urban resident 
workers.  
The first two results of our analysis strongly hint at segmentation of urban labor 
markets. We have a competitive segment for migrants where a new job can be found 
easily and where the labor supply curve is highly elastic, i.e. the new job offers in 
essence the same salary as the lost job, and a non-competitive segment where 
incumbents and quitters can extract rent while displaced workers are either 
completely rationed out of this part of the market or upon reemployment have to 
accept substantial wage cuts. The results, of course, also imply that urban displaced 
workers will not be hired into the competitive segment or are not willing to perform 
the tasks that migrant workers are asked to do.  
Several studies on informal employment in emerging economies find that this 
employment state is undesirable for a majority of workers since they associate job 
insecurity, poor working conditions and lack of social protection with it (see, e.g., 
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Lehmann, Razzolini and Zaiceva 2012). Thus perceived, the higher incidence of 
informal employment due to displacement imposes especially large costs on migrant 
workers while these costs are more modest for the urban sample. It is worth recalling 
from table 1 that informal employment, defined as working without a contract, is 
rather the exception than the rule even for migrant workers. The large decrease in the 
incidence of self-employment for displaced migrants can only be considered a cost of 
job loss if self-employment is thought to be a desirable state. This conjecture is, 
however, controversial in the literature since many researchers consider self-
employment in transition economies an employment state of last resort (see, e.g., 
Earle and Sakova 2000). The matching results for the urban sample are in line with 
this interpretation of self-employment since they show a slight increase in self-
employment associated with displacement. 
Self-assessed health is not affected by displacement in the case of migrants while 
urban residents who are displaced are slightly less healthy. In contrast, the body mass 
index (BMI), considered an objective measure of health, is in most estimates not 
significantly lower for the displaced than for their non-displaced counterparts. 
Displacement makes urban workers less happy albeit only slightly, a result not 
observed for displaced migrant workers. In contrast, there is an increased incidence of 
feeling depressed, which is particularly large for this latter group. The results in 
essence demonstrate that in both samples there are some psychic costs brought on by 
displacement. 
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4.2 Heterogeneous displacement effects  
The above cited literature on retrenchment establishes that the experience of displaced 
workers might differ by regional location, gender and age. To ascertain heterogeneous 
effects of displacement, we slice the urban sample by these dimensions and 
additionally partition the sample by ownership of the firm where the worker had 
her/his last job.  
The results of this last partition (panel 1 of table 6) show no differences as far as 
unemployment spells are concerned. Wage penalties upon reemployment, on the other 
hand, while existing for both types of displaced workers, are substantially larger for 
workers displaced from SOEs. Workers displaced from private firms incur some costs 
in terms of reduced working hours per week; in contrast, workers displaced from 
SOEs work between 3.5 and 5 hours more per week than their non-displaced 
counterparts. This latter result may be a reflection of a relatively short working week 
for stayers in the state sector. Relative to quitters and stayers only workers laid off 
from a job in the state sector have a higher incidence of informal employment. Those 
laid off from private firms are far less likely to be self-employed in the new job than 
their non-displaced counterparts while the reverse effect can be seen for workers 
being laid off from SOEs. Given that SOEs predominantly lay off workers from the 
lower end of the skills distribution, this points to the interpretation of self-
employment as a last resort. Self-assessed health is slightly worse only for those 
displaced from SOEs, while displaced from both types of firms feel less happy than 
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the non-displaced. The mirror image of this is a higher likelihood of feeling depressed 
for all laid off urban workers.  
Turning to the level of development (panel 2 of table 6) displacement is associated 
with substantially longer unemployment spells only for workers residing in developed 
regions. One reason might be the more generous income support available to 
displaced workers in these regions (Giles et al. 2005). Wage penalties are slightly 
larger in the more developed regions, while the larger number of working hours and 
the higher incidence of an informal current job is essentially the same in both 
subsamples. Increased self-employment, on the other hand, can only be found in the 
less developed regions. Health is weakly negatively associated with layoffs in both 
types of regions. In contrast the negative (positive) impact of displacement on 
happiness (feeling depressed) is given in regions, where there is more development.  
Men are more penalized than women regarding the increased spell of 
unemployment, whilst wage penalties and the increase in working hours do not differ 
markedly by gender (panel 3 of table 6). After a layoff event, both sexes experience 
more informality in the current job, but only males have a slightly increased incidence 
of self-employment and lower self-assessed and objective health.  
When we divide displaced workers by age we find that those who were 40 years 
of age or less at the time of job separation incur higher costs of job loss than older 
workers as far as an increased incidence of informal employment in the current job is 
concerned. For the other outcomes we do not find any systemic patterns and, 
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therefore, do not present the numeric results for this partition of the urban displaced 
workers.12  
In summary, after slicing the data by various dimensions our results clearly show 
that it is important to stratify the overall sample by level of development, gender and 
ownership type of firm when evaluating the economic, health and psychic costs of 
displacement, while age seems of lesser importance.  
5. Robustness Checks 
Our first robustness check13 consists in the tightening of the displacement definition. 
We exclude those workers from the displacement sample who separated from their 
jobs because of reason 5 given in table A1. A “dismissal initiated by employer” might 
entail individual layoffs connected to unsatisfactory performance or disciplinary 
problems. In addition, this type of dismissal might hit low productivity workers 
especially hard who in all likelihood perform worse upon job loss than displaced 
workers who separated from their jobs for one of the reasons 1 through 4 given in 
table A1.  
A comparison of the results using the more encompassing and the tighter 
definition of displacement shows only small differences regarding the length of 
unemployment spells for urban displaced workers. In addition, the fact that migrant 
displaced workers do not incur any costs in terms of prolonged unemployment is 
                                                 
12 They are available upon request, though.  
13 To save space, we only discuss the results of our robustness checks without presenting them. They 
are, however, available upon request.  
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confirmed with this tighter definition of displacement. The absence of a wage penalty 
upon reemployment for migrant workers is also a robust result, while the wage loss 
found for reemployed urban displaced workers is slightly smaller than in table 5, 
which can be understood as a weak confirmation of our supposition that individually 
dismissed workers might be on average of lower productivity.  Informal employment, 
self-employment, self-assessed health, happiness, and feeling depressed are all 
associated with displacement in the same fashion as when the more encompassing 
definition of displacement is used. The BMI, on the other hand, is never affected by 
displacement.  
 Restricting displacement to involuntary job separations caused by firm 
bankruptcy or closure is often considered a way to reduce selection biases (see, e.g., 
Kuhn 2002). We are fortunate insofar as the majority of displacements are linked to 
bankruptcy or closure in the RUMIC data set, which is rather unusual in survey data. 
For example in Russia and Ukraine, where we have similar survey data in emerging 
economies, redundancies outnumber displacements due to bankruptcy and closure by 
a wide margin (Lehmann et al. 2012). Since displacement events linked to bankruptcy 
or closure are considered “more exogeneous” than when redundancies are also 
involved, similar results with this more restrictive definition of displacement would 
imply that we are not just looking at correlations but a causal effect of displacement 
on the outcomes under study.  
27 
 
However, with this restrictive definition the number of observations is reduced to 
128 in the case of the migrant sample, which might lead to imprecise point estimates. 
Reduced significance certainly should not be a problem with the urban sample since 
we still have around 900 observations at our disposal. In comparison with the 
definition that includes redundancies, one of our main results still holds: migrants do 
not incur costs of displacement in the form of longer unemployment spells and of 
wage penalties while urban residents do. Also, the magnitudes of these costs are in the 
same ballpark as when we include redundancies.  Also, displacement has similar 
effects on self-employment, self-assessed health and happiness whether we include 
redundancies or not. An increased likelihood of informal employment and of feeling 
depressed is associated with displacement but with the definition of displacement 
restricted to firm closure these effects are only significant in the case of urban 
residents. All in all, the important results related to economic losses still pertain with 
this restricted sample of displaced.    
Our last robustness check alters the definition of controls by keeping only stayers 
in this group. In the early literature on displacement stayers were used to construct a 
counterfactual. However, more recently students of displacement have argued that 
stayers are too “stable” a group to be a credible counterfactual for the displaced. 
Instead, both stayers and quitters should be used for the construction of this credible 
counterfactual, since for a displaced worker the non-treatment state might be either 
staying at the firm or quitting the firm.  
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Compared to our analysis with the larger definition of controls we can establish 
qualitatively similar results when we use only stayers as controls. However some 
point estimates differ somewhat. For example, the wage penalty for urban displaced is 
now smaller. This is not a surprise since from Table 1 we know that quitters in the 
urban sample have a higher average wage than stayers. So, by not including quitters 
one actually understates the wage penalty. In contrast, the larger likelihood of being 
informally employed has an upward bias in the migrant sample, because migrant 
stayers have a lower incidence of informal employment than migrant quitters (see 
table 1). So, on this evidence it strikes us as better to choose both stayers and quitters 
as controls when one wants to estimate the true level of losses associated with 
displacement.     
Our robustness checks have shown that the results of table 5 remain virtually 
always valid whatever sample of displaced or controls we use. In particular, the 
dualistic nature of labor markets in cities is clearly confirmed, since our basic analysis 
presented in table 5 and our robustness checks all determine that displaced migrant 
workers are not confronted with longer job search than their non-displaced 
counterparts and that upon reemployment they do not face a wage penalty, while 
displaced urban workers incur large losses regarding these two outcomes.    
 
6. Conclusions 
Using unique data from the 2009 wave of the RUMIC data set, which covers 15 urban 
labor markets in China, we analyze the costs of worker displacement for rural-to-
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urban migrants and for workers who have urban residence rights (“hukou”). 
Displacement events refer to the years 2003 to 2009, which is a period marked by 
more natural job and worker reallocation than the late 1990s when large government-
inspired restructuring programs lead to massive layoffs of workers from SOEs.  
 Our paper pursues two research questions. Having data that allow a precise 
identification of displaced workers, of quitters and of stayers, and thus of the treated 
(displaced) and the controls, we attempt to evaluate economic, health and psychic 
costs of displacement in urban labor markets of China in a rigorous fashion. A 
rigorous evaluation has been difficult thus far due to a lack of appropriate data. In 
addition, we can undertake this evaluation for workers who separate not only from 
SOEs but also from private firms, and for a wider regional coverage than previously 
possible.   Our second research question wants to shed some light on the nature of 
urban labor markets in China. Having data on both migrants and workers with 
“hukou”, who both are actors in urban labor markets we can compare the losses 
associated with displacement in terms of unemployment spells and wage penalties 
upon reemployment. Similar losses across the two types of workers would indicate an 
integrated labor market while widely diverging costs would point to labor market 
segmentation. 
 We find that displaced migrant workers do not incur any costs in terms of 
increased unemployment spells and of wage penalties upon reemployment. In contrast 
urban workers when displaced experience very large costs in terms of prolonged 
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unemployment spells and are also confronted with wage penalties that amount to 
roughly 20 percent. These results are robust to the definition of displacement and to 
the choice of the control groups as well as when the data are stratified by ownership, 
gender and the level of development.  
This evidence clearly points to segmentation of urban labor markets in China. 
There is a competitive segment for migrants where the length of job search of quitters 
and displaced does not differ and where displaced workers upon reemployment 
receive a similar wage as quitters and stayers. For urban workers there exists a labor 
market segment that pays higher wages than in the segment for migrants; many of the 
displaced workers are rationed out of this segment of the market and if they find 
reemployment after prolonged job search they are confronted with large wage 
penalties. 
Once nation-wide data on displacement become available, future research thus 
should try to better capture the dualistic nature of urban labor markets and to identify 
the channels through which institutions impact on the behavior of displaced workers.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics: Sample means (and standard deviations) 
 
MIGRANT URBAN 
Demographics Displaced workers Quitters# Stayers 
Displaced 
workers Quitters# Stayers 
Age 33.466 31.162 31.758 46.470 38.345 38.519 
 
(10.057) (9.051) (11.189) (7.454) (8.989) (10.855) 
Male 0.656 0.607 0.523 0.506 0.464 0.545 
 
(0.476) (0.489) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499) (0.498) 
Married 0.670 0.655 0.592 0.926 0.852 0.775 
 
(0.471) (0.475) (0.492) (0.261) (0.355) (0.418) 
Yeas of education 9.061 9.298 9.409 10.519 11.941 12.447 
 
(2.661) (2.478) (2.692) (2.765) (3.228) (3.443) 
OWNERSHIP OF FIRM 
      
Working in SOE 0.135 0.105 0.151 0.796 0.405 0.662 
 
(0.342) (0.306) (0.358) (0.403) (0.491) (0.473) 
OUTCOMES 
      
Spell of Unemployment 4.207 5.083 -- 17.151 8.307 -- 
 
(10.028) (11.513) -- (24.815) (16.076) -- 
Hours 60.793 63.529 61.461 45.692 45.986 42.974 
 
(18.102) (17.871) (17.194) (12.457) (11.648) (10.163) 
Salary 1352.183 1378.100 1382.712 1445.205 2094.696 2081.407 
 
(560.291) (668.263) (703.382) (1140.224) (2357.869) (1677.906) 
Informal Employment 0.388 0.315 0.288 0.174 0.136 0.064 
 
(0.488) (0.465) (0.453) (0.379) (0.343) (0.245) 
self-employment 0.112 0.258 0.236 0.086 0.112 0.055 
 
(0.315) (0.438) (0.425) (0.281) (0.315) (0.228) 
Health 0.966 0.979 0.984 0.948 0.967 0.979 
 
(0.180) (0.144) (0.126) (0.222) (0.178) (0.143) 
depressed 0.103 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.041 0.026 
 
(0.304) (0.221) (0.217) (0.218) (0.198) (0.160) 
happiness 0.837 0.874 0.910 0.893 0.934 0.947 
 
(0.370) (0.332) (0.287) (0.309) (0.248) (0.225) 
BMI 22.109 21.961 21.817 22.972 22.388 22.498 
 
(3.079) (2.921) (2.955) (2.798) (2.874) (2.813) 
INDUSTRY 
      
Manufacturing 0.390 0.261 0.258 0.574 0.261 0.225 
 
(0.488) (0.439) (0.438) (0.495) (0.439) (0.418) 
Construction 0.131 0.142 0.124 0.064 0.075 0.069 
 
(0.338) (0.349) (0.329) (0.245) (0.263) (0.253) 
Low-level service 0.038 0.094 0.086 0.098 0.159 0.192 
 
(0.191) (0.292) (0.280) (0.297) (0.365) (0.394) 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
0.209 0.255 0.289 0.134 0.215 0.099 
 
(0.407) (0.436) (0.453) (0.341) (0.411) (0.298) 
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Table 1, continued 
 
Hotel and Catering 
Services 
0.180 0.193 0.180 0.031 0.058 0.028 
 
(0.385) (0.395) (0.385) (0.172) (0.233) (0.166) 
High-level service 0.052 0.055 0.063 0.099 0.234 0.387 
 
(0.223) (0.228) (0.243) (0.299) (0.423) (0.487) 
OCCUPATION 
      
Principals in 
governments, Parties, 
enterprises and 
institutions 
0.070 0.103 0.147 0.022 0.014 0.070 
 
(0.255) (0.303) (0.354) (0.148) (0.119) (0.255) 
Professional technicians -- -- -- 0.150 0.199 0.267 
 
-- -- -- (0.357) (0.399) (0.442) 
Clerk and relevant 
personnel 
0.195 0.218 0.187 0.153 0.181 0.243 
 
(0.397) (0.413) (0.390) (0.360) (0.386) (0.429) 
Commercial and service 
personnel 
0.366 0.415 0.421 0.205 0.348 0.185 
 
(0.482) (0.493) (0.494) (0.404) (0.476) (0.388) 
Manufacturing and 
relevant personnel 
0.369 0.265 0.245 0.413 0.180 0.163 
 
(0.483) (0.442) (0.430) (0.493) (0.384) (0.370) 
Other practitioner 
(difficult to classify) 
-- -- -- 0.057 0.077 0.072 
 
-- -- -- (0.231) (0.267) (0.259) 
Observations 358 3444 2184 1346 1598 3560 
Source: RUMIC data set, wave 2009. 
# Retirees and early retirees are excluded from the subsample of quitters. -- not applicable. 
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Table 2 Multinomial logit results for migrant sample – marginal effects 
 
 
Only demographic and ownership controls All controls 
 
Displaced  Quitters# Stayers Displaced  Quitters# Stayers 
Demographics 
      Male 0.0144*** 0.0783*** -0.0928*** 0.0126*** 0.0738*** -0.0864*** 
 
(0.00453) (0.00884) (0.00861) (0.00462) (0.00898) (0.00863) 
Married -0.00446 0.0904*** -0.0860*** -0.00155 0.0915*** -0.0899*** 
 
(0.00509) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.00521) (0.0113) (0.0109) 
Age 0.00100*** -0.00510*** 0.00410*** 0.00120*** -0.00398*** 0.00278*** 
 
(0.000246) (0.000574) (0.000569) (0.000252) (0.000568) (0.000558) 
Years of education -0.000748 -0.00473*** 0.00548*** -0.000751 -0.00518*** 0.00593*** 
 
(0.000811) (0.00179) (0.00177) (0.000857) (0.00182) (0.00178) 
Ownership-type 
firm last job 
      
SOE -0.00239 -0.0947*** 0.0971*** -0.00241 -0.0749*** 0.0773*** 
 
(0.00564) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.00569) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
Industry 
   
   Construction 
   -0.0229*** 0.0352** -0.0124 
    (0.00386) (0.0144) (0.0143) 
Low-level service 
   -0.0272*** -0.00363 0.0308 
    (0.00515) (0.0190) (0.0189) 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade    -0.0290*** -0.0450*** 0.0740*** 
    (0.00378) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
Hotel and Catering 
Services    0.00114 0.0449*** -0.0460*** 
    (0.00738) (0.0159) (0.0153) 
High-level service 
   -0.0149** -0.0223 0.0372* 
 
   (0.00729) (0.0210) (0.0208) 
Occupation 
   
   Clerk and relevant 
personnel    0.0819*** 0.0692*** -0.151*** 
    (0.0214) (0.0200) (0.0135) 
Commercial and 
service personnel    0.0270** 0.0634*** -0.0904*** 
    (0.0130) (0.0157) (0.0132) 
Manufacturing and  
relevant personnel    0.0723*** 0.0524** -0.125*** 
 
   (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0160) 
City 
   
   Shenzhen 
   -0.00201 0.0132 -0.0112 
    (0.00849) (0.0221) (0.0220) 
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Table 2, continued 
 
Dongguan 
   -0.0227*** 0.0162 0.00653 
    (0.00702) (0.0221) (0.0221) 
Zhengzhou 
   -0.00587 -0.0116 0.0175 
    (0.00889) (0.0215) (0.0215) 
Luoyang 
   0.0252* -0.132*** 0.107*** 
    (0.0143) (0.0242) (0.0250) 
Hefei 
   -0.0251*** -0.173*** 0.198*** 
    (0.00653) (0.0200) (0.0205) 
Bengbu 
   -0.0360*** -0.0939*** 0.130*** 
    (0.00580) (0.0242) (0.0245) 
Chongqing 
   0.000241 -0.0604*** 0.0601*** 
    (0.00842) (0.0193) (0.0196) 
Shanghai 
   -0.0280*** -0.185*** 0.213*** 
    (0.00565) (0.0181) (0.0186) 
Nanjing 
   -0.0358*** -0.291*** 0.327*** 
    (0.00437) (0.0157) (0.0164) 
Wuxi 
   -0.0341*** -0.382*** 0.416*** 
    (0.00549) (0.0149) (0.0159) 
Hangzhou 
   -0.00813 0.0474** -0.0393** 
    (0.00708) (0.0184) (0.0182) 
Ningbo 
   0.0140 0.0891*** -0.103*** 
    (0.0114) (0.0239) (0.0233) 
Wuhan 
   -0.00610 -0.0663*** 0.0724*** 
 
   (0.00743) (0.0186) (0.0188) 
Chengdu 
   -0.0176** -0.00988 0.0275 
 
   (0.00713) (0.0200) (0.0200) 
Pseudo R2 0.0113   0.0730 
  Observations 4388 4388 4388 4381 4381 4381 
Notes: Source: RUMIC data set wave 2009;  
# Retirees and early retirees are excluded from the subsample of quitters. Default categories are: 
private or mixed firm for ownership-type of firm, manufacturing for industry, principals in 
governments, parties, enterprises and institutions for occupation, and Guangzhou for city. 
*Significant at 10%;**significant at 5%;**significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3 Multinomial logit results for urban sample – marginal effects 
 
Only demographic and ownership controls All controls 
 
Displaced  Quitters# Stayers Displaced  Quitters# Stayers 
Demographics 
      Male -0.0775*** -0.0314*** 0.109*** -0.0723*** -0.0228*** 0.0951*** 
 
(0.00732) (0.00788) (0.00976) (0.00704) (0.00800) (0.00942) 
Married -0.0336** 0.0802*** -0.0467*** -0.0304** 0.0921*** -0.0616*** 
 
(0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0152) 
Age 0.0115*** -0.00538*** -0.00613*** 0.0108*** -0.00534*** -0.00547*** 
 
(0.000546) (0.000529) (0.000636) (0.000523) (0.000529) (0.000615) 
Years of 
education -0.0229*** -0.00108 0.0239*** -0.0109*** 0.00202 0.00885*** 
 
(0.00153) (0.00142) (0.00171) (0.00158) (0.00152) (0.00174) 
Ownership-type 
firm last job 
      
Working in SOE in 
last job 0.146*** -0.146*** 0.000392 0.137*** -0.130*** -0.00650 
 
(0.0120) (0.00448) (0.0118) (0.0113) (0.00514) (0.0110) 
Industry 
   
   Construction 
   -0.0996*** 0.0303 0.0694*** 
    (0.0123) (0.0185) (0.0196) 
Low-level service 
   -0.153*** -0.00408 0.157*** 
    (0.00743) (0.0131) (0.0139) 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade    
-0.0653*** 0.0279* 0.0375** 
    (0.0127) (0.0160) (0.0181) 
Hotel and 
Catering Services    
-0.115*** 0.0370 0.0775*** 
    (0.0171) (0.0245) (0.0277) 
High-level 
service    -0.173*** -0.0247** 0.198*** 
 
   (0.00663) (0.0116) (0.0124) 
Occupation 
   
   Professional 
technicians    0.0377 0.136*** -0.174*** 
 
   (0.0300) (0.0377) (0.0259) 
Clerk and 
relevant 
personnel 
   
0.0369 0.114*** -0.151*** 
    (0.0298) (0.0372) (0.0270) 
Commercial and 
service personnel    
0.107*** 0.163*** -0.269*** 
    (0.0343) (0.0391) (0.0214) 
manufacturing and  
relevant 
personnel 
   
0.114*** 0.124*** -0.239*** 
 
   (0.0327) (0.0379) (0.0228) 
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Other 
practitioner 
(difficult to 
classify) 
   
0.0601* 0.152*** -0.213*** 
 
   (0.0349) (0.0416) (0.0272) 
City 
   
   Shenzhen 
   0.0436 -0.0369* -0.00671 
    (0.0313) (0.0211) (0.0301) 
Dongguan 
   0.0515* -0.0396** -0.0119 
    (0.0284) (0.0201) (0.0281) 
Zhengzhou 
   0.0498* -0.144*** 0.0947*** 
    (0.0260) (0.0140) (0.0264) 
Luoyang 
   0.0887*** -0.132*** 0.0433 
    (0.0332) (0.0216) (0.0346) 
Hefei 
   0.0152 -0.102*** 0.0865*** 
    (0.0242) (0.0161) (0.0255) 
Bengbu 
   0.120*** -0.0976*** -0.0229 
    (0.0297) (0.0191) (0.0298) 
Chongqing 
   -0.000614 -0.0804*** 0.0810*** 
    (0.0226) (0.0156) (0.0236) 
Shanghai 
   0.0738*** 0.113*** -0.187*** 
    (0.0242) (0.0235) (0.0228) 
Nanjing 
   -0.00453 -0.110*** 0.115*** 
    (0.0239) (0.0155) (0.0252) 
Wuxi 
   0.0554** -0.0344 -0.0210 
    (0.0281) (0.0215) (0.0286) 
Hangzhou 
   0.0255 -0.0742*** 0.0486* 
    (0.0240) (0.0168) (0.0249) 
Ningbo 
   0.0405 -0.000688 -0.0398 
    (0.0288) (0.0237) (0.0294) 
Wuhan 
   0.0785*** -0.108*** 0.0298 
 
   (0.0247) (0.0149) (0.0245) 
Chengdu 
   0.0675*** -0.0295* -0.0380* 
 
   (0.0228) (0.0168) (0.0221) 
Pseudo R2 0.1089 
  
0.1853 
  
Observations 5953 5953 5953 5943 5943 5943 
Notes: # Retirees and early retirees are excluded from the subsample of quitters.  
Default categories are: private or mixed firm for ownership-type of firm, manufacturing for industry, 
principals in governments, parties, enterprises and institutions for occupation, and Guangzhou for city. 
*Significant at 10%;**significant at 5%;***significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4 Cumulative return rates to employment for quitters and displaced 
workers 
 
 Migrant Urban 
% returning Displaced Workers  Quitters# 
Displaced 
Workers  Quitters# 
< 1 month 0.458 0.498 0.367 0.529 
< 3 months 0.776 0.743 0.482 0.653 
< 6 months 0.881 0.843 0.554 0.717 
< 12 months 0.929 0.906 0.649 0.819 
mean completed duration 
(months) 4.207 5.083 17.151 8.307 
Observations 295 2991 814 1106 
Source: authors’ calculations based on 2009 wave of RUMIC data set. 
 
Table 5  Losses associated with worker displacement 
  
MIGRANT URBAN 
Demographic and 
ownership controls All controls 
Demographic and 
ownership controls All controls 
ols pscore ols pscore ols pscore ols pscore 
Unemployment spell 
-0.522 -1.606 -0.733 0.512 7.901*** 6.046*** 6.563*** 8.470*** 
(0.766) (1.357) (0.774) (0.982) (1.039) (1.761) (1.128) (1.706) 
Lnwage 
-0.038 0.000 0.002 0.021 -0.347*** -0.375*** -0.305*** -0.264*** 
(0.039) (0.076) (0.037) (0.059) (0.023) (0.053) (0.022) (0.039) 
Hours  
-2.610*** -1.226 -1.225 -1.837 1.615*** 3.303*** 1.824*** 2.074*** 
(1.103) (1.851) (1.049) (1.606) (0.407) (0.760) (0.420) (0.672) 
Informal employment 
0.106*** 0.118*** 0.089** 0.114*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 
(0.030) (0.047) (0.030) (0.045) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011) (0.017) 
Self-employment 
-0.162*** -0.143*** -0.099*** -0.119*** 0.003 0.045*** 0.006 0.009 
(0.026) (0.037) (0.022) (0.034) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.015) 
Health 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -0.012** -0.022** -0.015* -0.013 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.011) 
Happiness 
-0.028 -0.054 -0.030 0.015 -0.033*** -0.014 -0.029** -0.023 
(0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.038) (0.010) (0.023) (0.011) (0.018) 
Feel depressed 
0.059*** 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.040 0.014** 0.010 0.025*** 0.017 
(0.016) (0.028) (0.016) (0.030) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011) 
BMI 
-0.296* -0.493 -0.184 -0.089 -0.042 -0.428* 0.003 -0.115 
(0.175) (0.322) (0.176) (0.290) (0.086) (0.207) (0.092) (0.143) 
Source: authors’ calculations based on 2009 wave of RUMIC data set. 
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Table 6. Heterogeneity of losses of displaced urban workers by: ownership type of firm, level of development,  and gender  
 
Ownership  
Private SOE 
Demographic and ownership 
controls All controls 
Demographic and ownership 
controls All controls 
ols pscore ols pscore ols pscore ols pscore 
Unemployment spell 
4.758*** 6.803*** 4.431*** 9.836*** 8.063*** 6.980*** 7.311*** 9.515*** 
(1.493) (2.182) (1.528) (1.826) (1.543) (2.392) (1.626) (2.209) 
Salary 
 
-0.189*** -0.247*** -0.198*** -0.111* -0.429*** -0.438*** -0.340*** -0.278*** 
(0.050) (0.081) (0.046) (0.076) (0.026) (0.057) (0.025) (0.048) 
Hours 
-3.204*** -1.016 -2.541*** -1.421 4.207*** 4.984*** 3.461*** 4.010*** 
(0.974) (1.340) (0.960) (1.310) (0.418) (0.717) (0.447) (0.684) 
Informal employment 
0.014 0.066** 0.016 0.044 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 
(0.025) (0.036) (0.024) (0.034) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.016) 
Self-employment 
-0.125*** -0.063** -0.103*** -0.092*** 0.071*** 0.080*** 0.059*** 0.066*** 
(0.023) (0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
Health 
0.000 0.022 -0.001 0.007 -0.022*** -0.025** -0.019*** -0.011 
(0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.012) 
Happiness 
-0.026** -0.011 -0.029 -0.048** -0.039*** -0.042** -0.034*** -0.024 
(0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.029) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013) (0.023) 
Feel depressed 
0.052*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.065*** 0.013*** 0.021** 0.014*** 0.004 
(0.016) (0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) 
BMI 
0.087 -0.270 0.069 -0.198 0.012 -0.468** 0.007 0.009 
(0.176) (0.292) (0.178) (0.267) (0.103) (0.213) (0.110) (0.167) 
 
Note: Private displaced, quitters and stayers 273, 950 and 1029 respectively; 
          SOE displaced, quitters and stayers 1068, 646 and 2011 respectively. 
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Table 6, continued 
 
 
Level of development Cities in developed regions# Cities in less developed regions## 
ols pscore ols pscore ols pscore ols pscore 
Unemployment spell 
10.809*** 11.998*** 9.408*** 6.395*** 4.477*** 5.547*** 3.949*** 6.846*** 
(1.751) (2.530) (1.959) (2.959) (1.234) (2.052) (1.310) (1.848) 
Salary 
 
-0.397*** -0.340*** -0.349*** -0.301*** -0.297*** -0.173*** -0.262*** -0.226*** 
(0.030) (0.051) (0.031) (0.051) (0.032) (0.063) (0.032) (0.055) 
Hours 
2.319*** 1.911** 2.539*** 2.350*** 0.858* 2.328*** 1.162*** 1.737*** 
(0.595) (1.026) (0.622) (0.972) (0.545) (0.968) (0.563) (0.816) 
Informal employment 
0.103*** 0.098*** 0.108*** 0.118*** 0.068*** 0.072*** 0.083*** 0.100*** 
(0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.025) (0.016) (0.024) 
Self-employment 
0.002 -0.007 0.009 0.013 0.004 0.043** 0.006 0.033*** 
(0.012) (0.023) (0.013) (0.022) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019) 
Health 
-0.010 -0.017 -0.017 -0.020** -0.015 -0.024** -0.014* -0.005 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014) 
Happiness 
-0.047*** -0.081*** -0.046*** -0.028 -0.019 -0.025 -0.018 -0.011 
(0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.025) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.026) 
Feel depressed 
0.018 0.019 0.032*** 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.019 0.007 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) 
BMI 
-0.237*** -0.327* -0.066 -0.054 0.191* -0.268 0.173* -0.011 
(0.115) (0.202) (0.124) (0.193) (0.128) (0.260) (0.137) (0.216) 
Notes:         
# Guangzhou,Shenzhen,Dongguan,Shanghai,Nanjing,Wuxi,Hangzhou,Ningbo: displaced, quitters and stayers 629, 911 and 1562 respectively; 
## Zhengzhou, Luoyang, Hefei, Bengbu, Chongqing, Wuhan, Chengdu: displaced, quitters and stayers 717, 687 and 1998 respectively . 
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Table 6, continued 
 
Gender Female Male 
ols pscore ols pscore ols pscore ols pscore 
Unemployment spell 
6.915*** 3.912 5.362*** 1.256 8.540*** 8.890*** 7.238*** 10.151***       
(1.650) (3.075) (1.820) (3.384) (1.319) (1.854) (1.427) (1.914) 
Salary 
 -0.307*** -0.283*** -0.288*** -0.260*** -0.383*** -0.458*** -0.329*** -0.326*** 
 (0.033) (0.082) (0.032) (0.061) (0.031) (0.064) (0.030) (0.049) 
Hours 0.318 1.387 0.593 1.480* 2.660*** 4.257*** 2.650*** 2.708*** 
 (0.600) (1.156) (0.632) (0.866) (0.555) (0.954) (0.568) (0.902) 
Informal employment 0.087*** 0.094*** 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.098*** 0.108*** 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.017) (0.025) (0.013) (0.026) (0.014) (0.021) 
Self-employment -0.009 0.015 -0.009 0.021 0.014 0.052*** 0.016 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.027) (0.013) (0.022) 
Health -0.010 -0.017 -0.016 -0.023 -0.014 -0.029** -0.014 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.022) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.014) 
Happiness -0.025** -0.017 -0.022* -0.034 -0.046*** -0.005 -0.042*** -0.021 
 (0.013) (0.030) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.035) (0.016) (0.027) 
Feel depressed 0.002 -0.002 0.018 0.000 0.028** 0.028 0.032*** 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019) 
BMI 0.171* -0.314 0.153 -0.034 -0.251*** -0.553*** -0.188** -0.225* 
 (0.119) (0.302) (0.130) (0.215) (0.122) (0.259) (0.127) (0.195) 
         
Note: Female displaced, quitters and stayers 665, 857 and 1619 respectively; 
          Male displaced, quitters and stayers 681, 741 and 1940 respectively. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on 2009 wave of RUMIC data set. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1.  Reasons for leaving job, classification as quit or displacement, and their 
distribution: migrant and urban samples 2009 
 
Reasons Migrant Urban Classification 
1Factory bankruptcy or closure  128 914 Displacement 
2 Moving of enterprise/organization  29 85 Displacement 
3Factory acquisition, restructuring and 
privatization         19 294 Displacement 
4 Laid off collectively 27 314 Displacement 
5 Dismissal initiated by employer  48 66 Displacement 
6 Expiring of employment contract 50 237 Quit 
7 Expiring of probation time 15 17 Quit 
8 Own illness or injury  34 79 Quit 
9 Studies 21 27 Quit 
10 Retirement 7 1727 Quit 
11Early retirement 6 406 Quit 
12 Marriage  44 55 Quit 
13 Parental leave  56 179 Quit 
14 Need to take care of other members of family  57 85 Quit 
15 Change of residence 13 70 Quit 
16 Wanted/was proposed job with higher salary 
or better working conditions  1167 680 Quit 
17 Wanted/was proposed more interesting work  222 133 Quit 
18 Wanted to start own business 286 165 Quit 
19 Closure of own business 34 69 Quit 
20 Other (Specify) 429 266 Quit 
 Note ：Authors’ calculations based on 2009 wave of RUMIC data set.  
 
 
 
